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Ecosystem Offset Market 
(Under the direction of Todd BenDor) 
 
 
Extensive regulations have aimed to protect streams and wetlands threatened by 
development activities in the United States. However, failures to offset ecosystem damage with 
restoration of similar ecosystems have impeded ecological success of these policies. How do 
policies enforcing in-kind mitigation requirements -- e.g., prioritizing stream mitigation for 
stream impacts -- alter the structure of mitigation markets? I studied the mitigation market of 
Texas’s Upper Trinity River Basin, where regulators implemented novel, in-kind stream 
mitigation requirements in 2013. Drawing on impact and mitigation data (2007-2019), I used 
statistical models to examine the long-term effects of this policy on the Basin’s mitigation 
markets. I found that this policy spawned an enduring stream mitigation market, while driving 
declines in stream impact extents and wetland mitigation credits sold and supplied. These 
findings have implications for other districts seeking to establish in-kind mitigation requirements 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
While streams and wetlands provide essential ecosystem services and values (Cheng et 
al. 2020; Lal 2008; Nahlik and Fennessy 2016; Riley 1998), rapid urban development, climate 
change, invasive species introductions, and water pollution have impaired streams and wetlands 
around the world (Karl et al. 2009; MEA 2005; Vörösmarty et al. 2010). Prompted by concerns 
about wetland losses and degradation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) were charged with enforcing Section 404 of the 
U.S. Clean Water Act (33 USC 1344), which prohibited discharges into streams and wetlands 
without a permit. The law -- as amended in 1977 -- gave USACE regulatory districts the 
authority to issue impact permits, with which they eventually encouraged avoidance and 
minimization of wetland impacts (Hough and Robertson 2009). In the wake of unavoidable 
impacts, the USACE began requiring ecological restoration as offsets to avoid “net loss” of 
wetland resources (National Research Council 2001).  
The 1990s and early-2000s saw the development of a decentralized, regulated market 
primarily consisting of for-profit “mitigation banks,” private firms that sell credits as 
compensation for stream and wetland damage (BenDor and Doyle 2010; Hough and Harrington 
2019; Wilkinson and Thompson 2006), which generated $2.95 billion in transactions in 2003 
(ELI 2007). Mitigation bankers purchase land and restore or enhance the streams or wetlands 
within the property, compensating losses before impacts have occurred and tying ecological 




In 2008, the USACE and the USEPA created formal regulations (“the 2008 Rule”; 40 
CFR Part 230; 73 Fed. Reg. 19594, April 10, 2008) aimed at improving mitigation outcomes and 
success. Among other goals, the regulations attempted to create parity between different 
mitigation techniques to ensure that impacts to different aquatic ecosystems are compensated 
through restoration, enhancement, or preservation of the same ecosystems (i.e., “in-kind” 
mitigation), whenever possible.  
Wetland and stream impact metrics -- acres of wetlands and linear feet of streams, 
respectively -- are a crude currency, selected to represent both the fungible (land area) and non-
fungible (social values, ecosystem services) aspects of these ecosystems within the mitigation 
market (Salzman and Ruhl 2000). As a result, the "in-kind" offset requirement is one of several 
market constraints (along with clearly defined geographic service areas [Womble and Doyle 
2012] and credit release schedules [BenDor and Riggsbee 2011b]) imposed by the USACE that 
can minimize potential harm to the environment at the cost of potentially "thinning" the market 
of risk-aversive mitigation firms (and thereby reducing the availability of mitigation credits).  
However, despite explicit preferences by state governments and USACE regulatory 
districts (Doyle and Shields 2012) for in-kind mitigation, and articulated in a variety of federal 
(e.g., USEPA and USACE 1990; 2008) policies, failure to assure in-kind compensation for 
losses has led to the net gain of some resources at the expense of others. The 2008 Rule 
reaffirmed the goal of in-kind mitigation, but a survey of mitigation bankers found that 46% 
believed it did not lead to any increased levels of in-kind mitigation (BenDor and Riggsbee 
2011a). Even though a survey of USEPA staff indicated that more than 50% of permits are 
issued for stream impacts in many regions (Lave et al. 2008), many states still lack stream 




While there has been substantial growth in stream mitigation markets around the United 
States (USACE IWR 2015), many questions still remain about the impacts of in-kind mitigation 
requirements. In particular, how do in-kind mitigation requirements -- specifically, those that 
prioritize stream mitigation for stream impacts -- change the structure and operation of 
mitigation markets, including the prevalence of stream and wetland impacts and the supply and 
demand of mitigation credits?  
To answer this question, in this thesis, I present an assessment of the effects of the 
USACE Fort Worth District’s (SWF) 2013 Stream Mitigation Method (SMM), one of the first -- 
if not, the first -- formal, published policies to require in-kind mitigation for stream impacts in 
the United States. Using several statistical regression models (hurdle, ordinary least-squares, and 
breakpoint regressions), I assess wetland and stream impact and mitigation data (2007-2019; 
summarized at a monthly timescale) in the Upper Trinity River Basin, an active area of aquatic 
ecosystem impacts and mitigation that stretches across much of the State of Texas (Figure 1). 
My results indicate that the SMM prompted the formation of a lasting stream mitigation 
market, a reduction in credits sold within the wetland mitigation market, a reduction in the 
extents and average sizes of stream impacts, and a shift in mitigation investments by bankers 
from wetland to stream credits. While the SMM still facilitates a net loss of streams, the policy 
has greatly expanded the local mitigation market to provide in-kind mitigation for both stream 
and wetland impacts. The SMM could function as a model for other USACE districts seeking to 
balance the need for new sources of in-kind stream mitigation with USACE approved, pre-







Figure 1. Map of Upper Trinity River Basin study area, as well as wetland and stream impacts (n = 311) 
and mitigation banks (n = 8). Inset map shows Basin and USACE Fort Worth District (SWF) situated 






CHAPTER 2: METHODS AND DATA 
Study area 
The Trinity River provides drinking water for more than half of the State of Texas’s 29 
million residents, and its basin extends across 46,387 square kilometers and includes 1,424 
square kilometers of surface water (TRA 2016; US Census 2019; USDA et al. 2020). While the 
lower part of this basin falls within the boundaries of the neighboring USACE Galveston District 
(subject to different policies and not studied as part of this analysis), the Upper Trinity River 
Basin contains ~80% (18,690 km2) of the land area of the rapidly growing Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington Metropolitan Area (USDA et al. 2020; US Census 2020a). Among the 27 counties 
intersecting or contained within the Upper Trinity River Basin, seven are among the top 100 
fastest-growing counties in the United States (US Census 2020b).  
This study area is reminiscent of the Chicago, Illinois region in Robertson’s (2006), 
BenDor and Brozović’s (2007), BenDor et al.’s (2007), and Robertson and Hayden’s (2008) 
studies of wetland mitigation, with impacts similarly occurring in the metropolitan core and 
suburban areas and restoration generally occurring on the ex-urban outskirts. Moreover, this 
study area is representative of many other growing metropolitan areas in the United States, such 
as Atlanta, Georgia and San Antonio, Texas (US Census 2020b), where development has taken 




Within the Basin, all mitigation1 is provided by eight mitigation banks, which are each 
represented as individual wetland or stream mitigation sites that have been restored or enhanced 
and allowed to generate credits to offset development-related impacts that have been granted 
USACE regulatory approval. While these banks directly compete to offset impacts within the 
basin, the banks provide different credit types: 
Three banks are wetland banks (i.e., offering wetland credits): South Forks Trinity River 
Mitigation Bank (est. 2006), South Forks Trinity River Mitigation Bank Ten Mile Creek Tract 
(est. 2010), and Bunker Sands Mitigation Bank (est. 2008); 
Two banks are stream banks (i.e., offering stream credits): Mill Branch Mitigation Bank 
(est. 2012) and Bill Moore Mitigation Bank (est. 2017); 
Three banks provide both wetland and stream credits: Red Oak Umbrella Mitigation 
Bank - Palmer Tract (est. 2013), Rockin’ K on Chambers Creek Mitigation Bank (est. 2015), and 
Trinity River Mitigation Bank (est. 2001). 
Policy history  
In 2013, the Fort Worth District (SWF), the USACE district that encompasses my study 
area (Figure 1), implemented its Stream Mitigation Method (SMM), a novel policy that was part 
of an effort to address recommendations and requirements of the 2008 federal mitigation rule 
(USACE SWF 2013). While the district had a collection of documents defining mitigation 
procedures (ELI et al. 2016), it had not previously set any goals to limit the net loss of resources 
such as streams.   
 
1Mitigation banking is currently the primary and preferred method for mitigation in my study area, but in many 
USACE districts, other common mitigation methods include in-lieu fee (ILF) programs, which charge impactors 
fees that accrue and are spent on specific mitigation projects (USACE IWR 2015), and permittee-responsible 
mitigation (PRM), whereby developers themselves remain responsible for providing on-site or off-site mitigation 
(National Research Council 2001). As of May 2021, there were no ILF programs in the SWF District (USACE 




Under the SMM, the district established that stream impacts would require at least 50% 
of compensatory mitigation to come from approved stream mitigation banks. In the absence of 
available stream credits, developers would still be allowed to purchase wetland credits in lieu of 
stream credits (USACE SWF 2013). No comprehensive assessments of the effects of the SMM -- 
or any other policy like it -- have been attempted. This thesis endeavors to understand if (and 
how) the SMM has changed the stream and wetland mitigation markets within the Upper Trinity 
River Basin.  
Data 
Two primary databases track wetland and stream impact and mitigation activity in the 
United States; the first is the OMBIL Regulatory Module v.2 (“ORM2”) database, which the 
USACE has used nationally to manage records of aquatic impact permit applications and 
approvals since 2007 (USACE 2018). ORM2 tracks various facets of impact data, including 
permit numbers, the type of resource impacted, the project location (geographic coordinates), the 
authorized linear feet of impact (later replaced by the authorized fill length), the authorized acres 
of impact, and permit approval dates.  
From the USACE, I obtained all ORM2 approved permit data between October 2007 (the 
first year with reliable data within ORM2) and September 2019 (the end of the 2019 fiscal year). 
While 3,189 total permits were approved during this time period in the entirety of the Fort Worth 
District, only 2,405 (75.42%) impacted stream or wetland resources (of the remaining 784 
permits, 322 (41.07%) impacted lake resources while 418 (53.32%) impacted unclassified 
resources; the remaining permits impacted riparian areas) and, among those, only 954 (39.67%) 




The USACE also maintains the Regulatory In-lieu Fee and Bank Information Tracking 
System (RIBITS; USACE 2021b), which tracks in-lieu fee program (non-existent in my study 
area) and mitigation banking activity, including site approvals, credit releases (i.e., credits 
gradually become available for sale as a bank meets sequential biophysical thresholds; BenDor et 
al. 2011) and transaction data (i.e., credit sales). Transaction data (i.e., “credit sales ledgers”) 
include details on credit types (i.e., stream or wetlands, and sub-classes of each), transaction 
dates, impact permit numbers, and amounts of credit transactions (including the geographic area 
or linear feet that wetland or stream credits represent, respectively).2 Using RIBITS, I collected 
transaction data for the eight mitigation banks in the Upper Trinity River Basin from the first 
credit withdrawal in March 2002 until October 2020.  
Several prior studies have used RIBITS and ORM2 to study mitigation activity, including 
Hough and Harrington’s (2019) Environmental Law Institute study of mitigation banking 
activity, and Julian and Weaver’s (2019) analysis of stream mitigation demand in Colorado. 
However, there were two important barriers to using the entire extent of ORM2 permit data for 
this analysis.  
First, the USACE may issue permits for development projects that are never implemented 
(e.g., due to financial difficulties, such as the 2008 Great Recession; Martin 2020, personal 
correspondence) and therefore never incur environmental impacts. Therefore, it was important to 
only rely on permits that had corresponding, documented mitigation purchases. However, in 
many instances, it would have been very difficult to track down any non-bank mitigation data 
independently for each permit (e.g., see laborious process documented in BenDor et al. 2007).  
 
2In order to determine the SMM’s effects on no net loss of streams (a major goal of the 2008 rule), I converted 




Second, given that banking has long been the dominant mitigation method used in my 
study area, any non-bank mitigation records in the ORM2 data may be erroneous or not fully 
documented. Prior to June 2007, USACE districts stored their own permitting data separately, 
leading to divergent levels of quality when these data were aggregated into the ORM2 database 
(USACE 2018). Therefore, I decided to limit stream and wetland impact permits included in this 
analysis to only those during or after October 2007 (start of the 2008 fiscal year) that had 
documented, corresponding permit purchases from one of the eight mitigation banks in RIBITS 
(n = 264 permits; 27.67% of permits approved within the Basin). See Supp. Material 1 and Table 
S1 for a comparison of the universe of wetland and stream impacts in the Basin (n = 954) and the 
subset included in this analysis. 
I partitioned ORM2 impact data by month (n = 144 months; Oct. 2007 - Sept. 2019), 
aggregating permits into monthly totals of 1) linear feet [meters] of stream impacts and 2) acres 
[hectares] of wetland impacts.3 I similarly aggregated RIBITS data into monthly summaries (n = 
144 months; Oct. 2007 - Sept. 2019), organized into monthly 1) stream mitigation credit sales, 2) 
wetland mitigation credit sales, 3) new wetland credits released (i.e., authorized by USACE to be 
sold by the banks; representing credit supply), and 4) new stream credits released. 
Finally, I endeavored to understand if economic growth was associated with changes 
within the mitigation market in the Upper Trinity River Basin and whether it explained 
alterations in the market better than the implementation of the SMM. I used Texas’s Coincident 
Economic Index, developed by Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005) to assess the economic 
conditions of an individual state based on state employment, unemployment rates, average hours 
 
3Linear feet of stream impacts is equivalent to stream length; until October 2016, the USACE only recorded stream 
length measurements within ORM2 without (or only sporadically with) corresponding width measurements 
(USACE 2020a) that would facilitate precise area estimates of stream impacts. Therefore, for this analysis, I only 




worked, and real wage and salary disbursements (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2021). 
My analysis, presented in Supp. Material 2, found that the Index and time are so highly 
correlated (r = 0.99) as to render the inclusion impossible. Moreover, time is more easily 
interpretable as a covariate in my regression analyses. 
Analysis methods 
My goal was to understand the relationship, over time, between the SMM policy and 
amounts of wetland and stream impacts (demand for all mitigation, not necessarily in-kind), 
stream and wetland mitigation credit sales (representing in-kind mitigation demand post-SMM), 
and credit releases (in-kind mitigation supply). Alongside each of the monthly time series 
datasets discussed above, I represented the presence or absence of the SMM policy across my 
study period using a binary variable (1 = SMM present, implemented in October 2013; 0 = SMM 
absent). To understand the impact of the SMM on trends in mitigation and impact demand over 
time (i.e., changes in slopes/trends of mitigation or impact demand before and after SMM 
implementation), I also evaluated the interaction between time and this binary policy variable.  
Modeling impact and credit demand: hurdle models 
As part of my exploratory data analysis prior to regression modeling, I implemented 
unpaired two-sample t-tests (Welch procedure used because the assumption of equal variance 
cannot be assured with my data; Dalgaard 2008; Welch 1947) to understand shifts in average 
impacts and mitigation per month before and after the SMM. Exploratory data analysis revealed 
that monthly-aggregated impact and mitigation data were not normally distributed and contained 
a disproportionately large number of zeros, with many months containing very few or zero 




To manage the nuances in the monthly impact and mitigation sales dependent variables 
and their over-dispersion (i.e., many zero entries), I employed a statistical regression technique 
known as a hurdle model (Martin et al. 2018; Mullahy 1986), which contains two parts: a “zero 
hurdle model,” which determines whether the dependent variable is equal to zero or is positive 
(i.e., a logistic regression; Berkson 1944), and a count model, which estimates the size of the 
non-zero dependent variable (i.e., a gamma-distributed generalized linear model (GLM), which 
models positively skewed data with no negative entries [i.e., count data; Ng and Cribbie 2017] 
while employing a log link to connect the dependent variable to the independent variables and 
log transform the independent variables; Agresti 2015).  
Modeling credit supply analysis 
Robertson’s (2006) analysis of the Chicago mitigation market offers a framework for 
analyzing shifts in the availability of mitigation credits for sale by mapping the credits that were 
released over time as different mitigation banks moved through several stages of the bank 
approval process over nine years. For this analysis, I extended this idea by creating a dynamic 
measure of the number of available mitigation credits, which I call “credit supply.” This allowed 
me to expand on Robertson’s (2006) work to understand how credit sales impact the number of 
unsold credits over time as banks enter and exit the market.4 I defined the credit supply (ct) of a 
given month (t) as the sum of mitigation credits available for purchase at the start of a given 
month (at) and new credits released by the USACE to mitigation banks throughout the month (rt), 
subtracting the credits sold (st) during the same month: ct = at+rt-st. 
I calculated wetland and stream credit supply for each month of my study period and 
used an ordinary least-squares (OLS) model to regress credit supply on the same independent 
 
4This is an alternative measure to RIBITS’ “potential credits” metric, which is a more static count of the sum of all 




variables as previous regressions: the binary indicator of the SMM, time (month), and the 
interaction between the SMM and time (Table 1). 
Modeling the timing of market changes: breakpoint regressions 
Finally, after developing, running, visualizing, and analyzing my hurdle and linear 
regression models, I also implemented a “breakpoint regression” for each of the models. 
Breakpoint regression attempts to determine the true “breakpoint” of the model based on the data 
alone; i.e., it does not consider the actual implementation date of the SMM and instead uses 
patterns in the data to estimate inflection points (Muggeo 2003). This can help to understand 
whether the SMM is most likely the reason for hypothesized shifts in impact or mitigation 
behavior, or if additional, unobserved factors may have played a role.  
Table 1. Hurdle and linear regression models employed. ORM2 (USACE 2020a) and RIBITS (USACE 
2020b) refer to impact and mitigation databases, respectively. Odds ratio (OR) and incident rate ratios 
(IRR) refer to the exponentiated outputs of hurdle models’ logistic and count models, respectively. All 
models rely on three independent variables: time (month; Oct. 2007 to Sept. 2019), SMM (binary; 1 = 
Oct. 2013 and later), Time*SMM (interaction). Breakpoint regressions were additionally performed for 
each of these dependent variables, using only time (month) as an independent variable. 
 
 
Model and Dependent 
Variable Source Outputs 
Estimated 
Breakpoints 
Hurdle models Stream impacts (linear ft) ORM2 Exponentiated 
coefficients (OR, IRR) 
Time (month) 
Wetland impacts (ac) ORM2 Exponentiated 
coefficients (OR, IRR) 
Time (month) 
Stream mitigation credit 
sales (credits) 
RIBITS Exponentiated 
coefficients (OR, IRR) 
Time (month) 
Wetland mitigation credits 
sales (credits) 
RIBITS Exponentiated 




Stream credit supply 
(credits) 
RIBITS Coefficients Time (month) 
Wetland credit supply 
(credits) 




All regression models are summarized in Table 1 and all statistical analyses and data 




5Visualization and statistical packages for R included dplyr (v1.0.4, Wickham et al. 2021), ggplot2 (v3.3.3, 
Wickham 2016), ggthemes (v4.2.4, Arnold 2021), lmtest (v0.9-39, Zeileis and Hothorn 2002), lubridate (v1.7.9.2, 




CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Summary statistics 
Figure 2 shows patterns of monthly stream and wetland impacts, mitigation, and credit 
supply over the course of the study period, while Table 2 shows differences in the distributions 
of each of these factors. The average, pre-SMM monthly rates of wetland impacts (1.56 acres 
[0.63 ha]), stream impacts (1436.72 linear ft [437.91 m]), wetland credit sales (14.08 credits), 
and wetland credit supplies (675.83 credits available) declined after the SMM (to 1.05 ac [0.42 
ha], 1158.72 linear ft [353.18 m], 6.60 credits sold, and 654.74 credits available, respectively). 
However, the average monthly stream credit supply on hand of 431.26 credits during the pre-
SMM period increased to 10,128.59 credits after SMM implementation (Table 2). Furthermore, 
the average impact size per permit per month before the SMM declined from 2.14 acres [0.87 ha] 
to 0.85 acres [0.34 ha] of wetlands and 1366.75 linear feet [416.59 m] to 866.75 linear feet 
[264.19 m] of streams (Table 2). The difference between pre-SMM and post-SMM means was 
significant for average monthly stream impacts per permit, stream mitigation sales per month, 
wetland mitigation sales per month, and stream credit supplies per month (Table 2).  
Much of my impact and mitigation data were over-dispersed; monthly total wetland 
impacts ranged from 0 to 31.79 acres per month, but across 34.03% (n = 49 months) of the 144-
month study period, no impacts occurred, and more than half of the study period contained less 
than 2 acres of impacts per month (52.08%; n = 75 months). Likewise, wetland mitigation credit 




months) of months saw zero credit sales, and 27.78% (n = 40 months) saw sales of less than 2 
credits.  
Table 2. Average monthly stream and wetland impacts, mitigation credit sales, and mitigation credit 
supplies before and after SMM implementation (October 2013). Difference in means assessed with 
Welch’s (1947) two-sample t-test procedure (95% confidence intervals given in parentheses).  
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.  
 
Variable  Pre-SMM mean  





Stream impacts (ft)  1436.72  
(1055.1; 1818.35)  
1158.72  
(746.13; 1571.31)  
0.99  
Wetland impacts (ac)  1.56  
(0.35; 2.77)  
1.05  
(0.61; 1.5)  
0.78  
Avg. stream impact per 
permit (ft)  
1366.75  
(1007.54; 1725.97)  
866.75  
(622.97; 1110.52)  
2.31**  
Avg. wetland impact 
per permit (ac)  
2.14  
(0.42; 3.86)  
0.85  
(0.40; 1.31)  
1.47  
Stream mitigation sales 
(credits)  
0  
(NA; NA)  
251.57  
(170.87; 332.27)  
-6.22***  
Wetland mitigation 
sales (credits)  
14.08  
(10.57; 17.58)  
6.60  
(3.14; 10.06)  
3.03***  
Wetland credit supply 
(credits)  
675.83  
(652.29; 699.37)  
654.74  
(643.3; 666.17)  
1.61  
Stream credit supply 
(credits)  
431.26  
(240.34; 622.18)  
10128.59  
(8911.71; 11345.46)  
-15.70***  
 
As described in Supp. Material 3, I attempted to convert stream credits to linear feet of 
restoration. From July 2014, when the first stream credits were sold, through September 2019, 
developers impacted 69,341.00 linear feet of streams, and stream mitigation banks sold credits 
generated from restoring approximately 34,782.52 linear feet of streams. This means that for 




the in-kind component of the SMM), with the rest of the mitigation purchased in the form of 
wetland credits.  
Figure 2. Monthly (A) total stream impacts, (B) total wetland impacts, (C) average stream impacts per 
permit, (D) average wetland impacts per permit, (E) stream mitigation credit sales, (F) wetland mitigation 
credit sales, (G) stream mitigation credit supply, and (H) wetland mitigation credit supply, before and 
after implementation of the SMM (indicated by dotted vertical lines; Oct. 2013). Trend lines over time for 
impacts and credit sales (panels A-F) are split before and after SMM implementation and employ count 











Stream and wetland impacts 
I regressed stream and wetland impacts and mitigation using a series of hurdle models to 
control for time, implementation of the SMM, and interaction effects between the SMM and time 
(Table 3). My interpretations of these models focus on the count components (i.e., the incident 
rate ratios [IRR]), which seek to predict the rates of non-zero impacts or mitigation per month.  
The first model, evaluating the relationship between stream impacts and the SMM, reveals that, 
while the SMM appears to be associated with a stepwise increase in stream impacts, the 




after SMM implementation (IRR = 0.98; p<0.1). This same trend does not significantly hold for 
wetlands; the hurdle model of wetland impacts did not determine a clear relationship between the 
implementation of the SMM and wetland impact volumes. 
Stream and wetland mitigation credit sales 
While stream mitigation credit sales clearly increased after SMM implementation, the 
lack of pre-SMM sales made it impossible to model the effects of the SMM on stream credit 
sales. Figures 2E and 2G show the post-SMM emergence of this new market for stream credits. 
Per Figure 2F and Table S4 (see Supp. Material 4), prior to the SMM, the wetland credit market 
was growing at an average rate of 1% per month.6 However, after implementation of the SMM, I 
found a significant declining trend in wetland mitigation credit sales (time*SMM interaction 
effect; Table 3), where a one month increase in time resulted in a ~5% decrease in wetland 
credits sold (IRR = 0.95; p<0.01).  
Credit supply 
I found diverging relationships between wetland and stream credit supplies and 
implementation of the SMM (Table 3). While wetland credit supplies grew at an average rate of 
~1 additional credit added to the market per month before SMM implementation (Figure 2H; 
Table S4), the SMM was associated with a reversal of this pattern. My OLS model of wetland 
credit supply reveals a decline of 2.05 credits per month (p<0.01; again, the time*SMM 
interaction effect) after SMM implementation (which must be weighed against the 1.01 
credit/month increasing trend the regression found across the entire 144-month study period; 
p<0.05).  
 
6Models of wetland mitigation sales and stream and wetland mitigation supply were conducted independently for the 
pre- and post-SMM periods using time (month) as a single independent variable. The results of these models can be 






Table 3. Hurdle and OLS model predictions of the effects of the Stream Mitigation Method (SMM) on impacts, mitigation, and credit supply. 
Hurdle models show effects on odds ratios (OR) for logistic (binary) components and incident rate ratios (IRR) for gamma (count) components. 
OLS models show coefficients (95% confidence intervals shown in parentheses). * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
 Hurdle Models OLS Models 
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AIC 163.87 175.15 - 123.9 1778.9 300.61 - 809.04 2574.37 1663.01 
Log 
Likelihood 


































Stream credit supply remained zero until June 2012, when 1940.66 credits were released 
by the USACE to Mill Branch Mitigation Bank (USACE 2020a). These credits remained unsold 
(with no additional releases made) until SMM implementation in October 2013. After SMM 
implementation, Figure 2G and Table S4 show that stream credit supply grew at an average rate 
of ~217 credits per month. My OLS model (Table 3) likewise shows that post-SMM credit 
supply increased by ~189 credits per month (p<0.01), in addition to the ~28 credit increase per 
month over the entire 144-month study period (p<0.01). 
Breakpoint regressions 
For each of the aforementioned models, I aimed to determine a “true” breakpoint that 
indicates the inflection points in each impact, mitigation sale, and mitigation supply time series, 
discarding my knowledge of the actual implementation date of the SMM. In three of the five 
models -- wetland impacts, stream credit supply, and wetland credit supply -- I found a 
breakpoint occurring prior to implementation of the SMM (Table 3). In the other two models -- 
stream impacts and wetland credit sales -- I found breakpoints occurring after SMM 
implementation. All of the breakpoint regressions relating to mitigation -- wetland mitigation and 
stream and wetland credit supplies -- had confidence intervals that stretched over less than two 
years. 
The wetland credit sales model determined a breakpoint approximately two and a half 
years after the SMM was implemented, while the wetland credit supply model determined a 
breakpoint approximately three and a half years before the SMM was released. Stream credit 
supply was closest to the actual implementation date of the SMM, with an estimated breakpoint 




impacts estimating a breakpoint between 2007 and 2014 and stream impacts estimating a 




CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
My analysis reveals that, on average, there has been a significant, declining trend in 
stream impacts after SMM implementation, as indicated visually in Figures 2A and 2C and 
analytically in Table 3. Why did this occur? 
I hypothesize that the decline may have resulted from a shift in the way that mitigation 
credits were priced, before and after the SMM. I can take two permits as an anecdotal example; 
in 2008, five years prior to the SMM, the Trinity River Mitigation Bank charged the Texas 
Department of Transportation (TXDOT; permit SWF-2008-00340) $57,000 for 4.8 wetland 
credits to offset 0.31 acres [0.13 ha] of stream impacts (McDaniel 2021, personal 
communication; USACE 2020a). Contrasting this, in 2019 (11 years later and 6 years after the 
SMM), a stream mitigation bank, Mill Branch Mitigation Bank, charged the same permittee, 
TXDOT (permit SWF-2018-00449), $121,982 for 87.13 stream credits to offset 250 linear feet 
[76.2 m] of stream impacts, which the USACE also calculated in terms of an areal measure of 
stream channel: 0.19 acres [0.08 ha]. This latter case represents a much higher cost for a smaller 
area of impact of streams relative to wetlands (McDaniel 2021, personal communication; 
MBMB 2019; USACE 2020a).  
I theorize that, as demand for ecosystem-specific (in-kind) stream credits replaced 
demand for what had been more generalized wetland credits, the supplies of wetland credits 
dropped as suppliers (i.e., bankers) pivoted towards stream credits. In addition, more stringent -- 
and potentially more expensive -- ecological standards for mitigation banks were encouraged by 
the USACE within the district after SMM implementation (USACE SWF 2015). Therefore, I 
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would expect that prices would rise for both stream (increased demand) and wetland (reduced 
supply) mitigation credits in the wake of the SMM. If this pricing trend were systematic, 
increased mitigation costs would likely discourage many impacts, thus prompting the decrease in 
stream impact volumes (Figure 2A) and average impact sizes (Figure 2C). However, there are 
still cases of large, linear infrastructure projects capable of generating extensive quantities of 
impacts, even with much higher mitigation expenses; for example, Atmos Energy Corporation’s 
permit in 2016 (SWF-2016-00049; USACE 2020a) impacted 8,635 linear feet of streams, while 
another TXDOT project impacted 5,892 linear feet of streams in 2016 (SWF-2015-00506; 
USACE 2020a). However, these permits appear to be outliers.  
I would expect that among the likely implications of the SMM’s 50% in-kind mandate 
would be a sharp decline in the average number of wetland credits purchased from banks, along 
with a strong increase in stream mitigation credit purchases. Both are confirmed by my analysis. 
It is clear from Figure 2E that the SMM played a major role in opening the market for stream 
mitigation banking. Before the SMM, there were no credits sold for streams; afterward, bankers 
began selling an average of ~252 credits a month (2013-2019). Additionally, stream credit 
supply increased rapidly under the SMM as more banks entered the market and generated 
credits. Concurrently, although wetland credit supply rose consistently before the SMM, I now 
observe wetland credit supplies slowly declining (Figure 2H) as the demand for wetland credits 
drops in the wake of in-kind mitigation requirements. 
My breakpoint analysis determined a wetland mitigation breakpoint approximately two 
and a half years after the SMM was released. Under the SMM, if stream credits were 
unavailable, developers were allowed to purchase wetland credits (USACE SWF 2013). In the 




though credits were available), and from July 2014 until February 2015, only one stream bank 
sold credits (USACE 2020a). Therefore, my wetland credit demand breakpoint seems to indicate 
that while the SMM opened the market for stream banking, wetland banking continued to direct 
the market until potentially late 2015.  
As the first stream credits were sold in July 2014, nine months after the SMM was 
released, even though they were approved in 2012, I hypothesize that wetland banks were still 
selling credits to entirely offset stream impacts approved before the passage of the SMM (i.e., 
“grandfathered permits”; Galik and Olander 2018). This limbo period may explain why wetland 
credit sales do not immediately drop upon SMM implementation in Figure 2F, and why the 
breakpoint for wetland credit sales is not estimated until 1.5-3.5 years after SMM 
implementation (Table 3). Eventually, however, permits began to be approved under the SMM, 
and, upon projecting the higher cost for credits, permittees either paid increased mitigation costs, 
avoided impacts entirely (and therefore, were not included in this study), reapplied for a permit 
impacting fewer wetland acres or stream linear feet, or abandoned the permit. Additional 
anecdotal evidence from transactional data between the TXDOT and Trinity River Mitigation 
Bank indicates that some banks eventually began to increase prices for wetland credits as well, 
representing essentially a “re-appraisal” of wetland credit values (TRMB 2019).  
Breakpoints for stream and wetland credit supplies were both estimated to be well before 
the SMM was released. Stream credit supply’s breakpoint was placed before the SMM but only 
by 7 months. In contrast, the earlier, March 2010 breakpoint for wetland credit supplies was 26 





I hypothesize that discussions of the SMM proposal -- which first began in the fall of 
2012-- may have both affected the mitigation market and been affected by ongoing market shifts. 
First, any proposed regulatory intervention regarding stream credits may have signaled future 
decreasing demand to wetland bankers, thus prompting decreased efforts to create more credit 
supplies before the SMM was formally implemented. Second, the first release of stream credits 
in June 2012 -- which was obviously the true breakpoint in establishing the SWF stream 
mitigation market -- may have influenced the regulatory landscape. With stream credits 
becoming available, the USACE in the Fort Worth District may have felt pressure to fulfill in-
kind requirements present in the 2008 Rule, regardless of the particularly extensive supply of 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
Prior to the SMM, four existing banks controlled all mitigation credits in the USACE 
Fort Worth District, and all Basin impacts -- streams and wetlands -- were offset using wetland 
credits (USACE 2020b). In 2013, the SMM -- the first and possibly only formal, published in-
kind mitigation requirement in the United States -- rapidly opened the Upper Trinity River 
Basin’s market for stream mitigation, with the first stream mitigation bank transaction occurring 
the following year (2014).  
The SMM represents a novel effort to balance the promotion of new, in-kind mitigation 
priorities with protections for a long-established mitigation industry. My analysis suggests that 
this balancing act has had a variety of effects, direct and induced. First, my analysis suggests 
that, while the SMM appears to have accomplished its 50/50 in-kind stream mitigation goal, it is 
clear that the requirements of the SMM cannot achieve the “no net loss” mandates of the 2008 
Rule.  
Second, the SMM appears to have reduced the total volume and average size of stream 
impacts. My analysis suggests that, by requiring more stringent, in-kind mitigation, the SMM 
induced higher mitigation costs, thereby making stream impacts more expensive and increasing 
the economic incentives for developers to minimize stream impacts.   
The USACE considers rivers and streams fragile and difficult to replace (USACE and 
USEPA 2008), and mitigation is not always successful, depending on whether “success” refers to 
improved hydrologic processes, biogeochemical processes, ecological processes, or other 
processes (Louhi et al. 2011; Palmer et al. 2014). Therefore, stream impact avoidance is still 
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important (Clare et al. 2011), regardless of the improvements in the science of restoration and 
enhancement that mitigation bankers and scientists have proposed and begun to implement, like 
designer streams or uncontrolled restoration projects (Lave and Doyle 2021).  
In weighing the implications of the SMM for the future of mitigation, it is important to 
consider that the SMM represents a complex compromise between established wetland banking 
firms, regulators, land developers, and newly emerging stream banking firms. The SMM 
uniquely prioritizes stream mitigation where it previously had not existed, while recognizing the 
complicated political nature and diverse interests operating in the district’s established mitigation 
market. By requiring partial, in-kind mitigation for stream impacts, the district attempted to avoid 
the perception of a regulatory “taking” and any potential litigation from established wetland 
mitigation banking firms within the district (Walker 2021, personal correspondence) and may 
have tried to avoid cooling effects on the willingness of banking firms to enter the market.  
This compromise opened the market to new stream mitigation firms and protected the 
interests of established wetland banks. While it appears that wetland bankers were negatively 
affected by the policy, with sales volumes declining, anecdotal evidence suggests that the SMM 
allowed these bankers to raise their prices, thereby increasing their margins beyond what they 
were in pre-SMM conditions.  
Implications for policy 
While plenty of USACE districts and states have expanded their policies regarding 
stream mitigation in response to the 2008 Rule, beyond the SMM, there are no formally 
published policies with clear, in-kind stream mitigation requirements. Generally, it appears that 
the market growth for stream mitigation has outpaced the development of USACE district-level 




historically been mandated (or even available), districts have historically defaulted to allowing 
out-of-kind mitigation for stream impacts.  
As of 2014, there were 29 states without approved stream mitigation credits (USACE 
IWR 2015). While the national stream mitigation market has grown rapidly, most stream 
mitigation banks were within a limited number of states, such as North Carolina, Virginia, 
Kentucky, and Texas. Several states, including Minnesota and Wisconsin, were home to 
numerous wetland banks in 2014 (140 and 29 banks, respectively; USACE 2021d), but not a 
single stream mitigation bank (USACE IWR 2015). In these states, if mitigation banking were to 
remain the sole compensatory practice, stream impacts would continue to be mitigated by 
wetland mitigation banks (or via other mitigation methods, which include their own problems; 
Wilkinson 2009; BenDor et al. 2014). 
This Fort Worth case study implies that -- rather than harming the mitigation industry -- 
localized, in-kind mitigation requirements can usher in an expanded, more competitive, and 
ultimately, more sustainable mitigation market. This should be encouraging to other USACE 
districts, especially those experiencing increasing pressure on water resources. Indeed, 
conversations with regulators indicate that other districts have noted the SMM, intending to learn 
from it and potentially apply it within their own regulatory boundaries (Walker 2021, personal 
correspondence).  
However, my analysis also suggests that policymakers should not expect the market to 
change immediately. SMM implementation did not lead to a sudden shift in mitigation banking 
behavior. Instead, I observed gradual market shifts, especially as stream banks began selling 
credits in 2014. Moreover, the wetland credit breakpoint suggests that there was a two-year 




The literature includes several solutions to shift the market at an even faster rate, such as 
speeding up reviews of mitigation projects to allow for rapid approval for mitigation banks 
(Kihslinger et al. 2020). Other potential solutions include allowing higher rates of “advance 
credit sales” -- i.e., credits sold before all performance standards are met -- to early in-kind 
market entrants (Galik and Olander 2018).  
However, several banks had approved stream credits before the SMM but did not sell 
immediately upon the SMM’s release (USACE 2020a). Grandfathered permits may have limited 
stream bank participation. While grandfathering is a common environmental market practice 
(Galik and Olander 2018), it can stifle new actors, prioritize older ones (Nash 2009), and reduce 
the probability of a policy accomplishing its goals (Damon et al. 2019).  
Reducing the ability of banks to grandfather pre-policy permits may be the most useful 
step in growing a stream market quickly. If grandfathering is inevitable, care should be taken to 
reduce negative outcomes for the policy. Any grandfathering that may occur should be made 
temporary, like granting exceptions to developers purchasing credits for a strict, limited period of 
time and prohibiting grandfathering if the policy is later updated (Damon et al. 2019).  
This discussion suggests that additional investigations are needed to determine ways of 
protecting the mitigation market as regulators seek to add in-kind mitigation requirements. In my 
analysis, several banks (Trinity River Mitigation Bank, South Forks Trinity River Mitigation 
Bank, and South Forks Trinity River Mitigation Bank Ten Mile Creek Tract) recorded fewer 
transactions post-SMM, indicating that the SMM may have differentially harmed or benefited 
specific banks. If banks remain the preferred mitigation mechanism -- as explicitly spelled out in 
the 2008 Rule as a way of elevating mitigation quality across the board -- then it behooves 




How can USACE districts avoid undermining banks in the wake of these types of 
regulatory changes? How can districts avoid damaging the established mitigation industry, while 
promoting in-kind mitigation and achieving full no net loss of specific ecosystems? Stated in 
another way: how can other districts avoid the tradeoffs that the Fort Worth District faced in 
creating the SMM? Addressing these questions will enhance the ability of USACE Districts to 
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